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Macro level data indicate that people experiencing mental distress experience poor health, social and
economic outcomes. The sociology of mental health has a series of dominant competing explanations of
the mechanisms at personal, social and structural levels that generate these poor outcomes. This article
explains the limitations of these approaches and takes up the challenge of Hopper (2007) who in this
journal proposed the capabilities approach as a means of normatively reconceptualising the experiences
of people with mental distress, with a renewed focus on agency, equality and genuine opportunity. Using
an innovative methodology to operationalise the capabilities approach, ﬁndings from an in-depth
qualitative study exploring the lived experiences of twenty-two people with recent inpatient experi-
ence of psychiatric units in Scotland are presented. The paper demonstrates that the capabilities
approach can be applied to reconceptualise how unjust social outcomes happen for this social group. It
distinguishes how the results of using a capabilities approach to analysis are distinct from established
dominant analytical frameworks through four added features: a focus on actual lived outcomes; the role
of capabilities as well as functionings; being normative; and incorporating agency. The capabilities
approach is found to be an operationalisable framework; the ﬁndings have implications for professionals
and systems in the speciﬁc context of mental health; and the capabilities approach offers a fertile basis
for normative studies in wider aspects of health and wellbeing.
© 2017 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Evidence indicates that social outcomes for people with mental
distress are persistently poor. They experience lower life expec-
tancy (Thornicroft, 2011, p.441), aremore likely thanmost people to
live in relative poverty (Rethink, 2003), be victims of violence
(ODPM, 2004, p.25), live in disadvantaged areas (Tew, 2011, p.37),
live alone (ODPM, 2004, p.86), have ﬁnancial problems (ODPM,
2004, p.85), and have less access to employment (ODPM, 2004,
p.1). They tend to experience stigma and discrimination (ODPM,
2004, p.24) including at work (e.g. Coppock and Dunn, 2010,
pp.111e112). Life for many can become ongoing “predicament”
(Barham and Hayward, 1991) or “trap” (Estroff, 1981) caught be-
tween living freely and being at risk of having freedom constrained
by state actors, including, for example, having their ability to parent
questioned (Read and Baker, 1996).
Macro-level research has also contributed to understandingLtd. This is an open access articlesocial determinants of mental distress. Income and relative poverty,
unemployment and poor quality employment are associated with
risk of mental disorders (WHO and Calouste Gulbenkian
Foundation, 2014, p.24). Evidence suggests that “social injustice is
killing people on a grand scale” (WHO Commission on Social De-
terminants of Health 2008, p.26), especially so for people with
mental distress (2008, p.98, Table 9.1), determined by socioeco-
nomic context and position, exposure, vulnerability and health care
access.
The capabilities approach (CA), developed by Sen (e.g. 1980,
1999) and Nussbaum (e.g. 2006), has been operationalised for
other social groups experiencing poor outcomes (e.g. Dean et al.,
2005; Wolff and De-Shalit, 2007; Burchardt and Vizard, 2011).
Hopper (2007) has argued that in principle the CA offers a frame-
work for analysis of agency/structure relations, diversity, personal
experience, normativity and the role of resources which interact to
shape social outcomes for people with mental distress. Arguing
that capabilities speaks “to citizenship as well as health” (2007,
p.875), and enables accounting of “vital contextual features e the
enabling resources, rules and connections that make prizedunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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this merits empirical work (2007, p.876).
The aim of this paper is to explore the analytical advantages of
using a capabilities approach to conceptualise social outcomes
experienced by people with mental distress. It applies data from an
in-depth qualitative study exploring the lives of people with recent
experience of being in psychiatric hospital in Scotland, UK. The
paper ﬁrst outlines the dominant analytical frameworks used to
interpret the experiences of people with mental distress. Concepts
from the CA are then discussed and the study design described. The
paper then highlights empirical ﬁndings which demonstrate con-
tributions to analysis activated by applying the CA, namely: main-
taining a focus on actual lived outcomes; taking into account what
people could alternatively do (capabilities) as well as what people
are doing (functionings); highlighting the role of agency; and using
a normative framework. These demonstrate the promise of capa-
bilities, as suggested by Hopper (2007), in providing an original
explanation of how differential social outcomes happen for people
with mental distress.
2. Social perspectives of mental distress and explanation of
poor social outcomes
The dominant western interpretation of certain emotional ex-
periences as ‘mental illness’, and the contingent model of treat-
ment as being through a part-coercive psychiatric system of
asylums, hospitals, diagnoses and physical, chemical and psycho-
logical interventions, was based on a number of dominant post-
Enlightenment inﬂuences, including notions of rationality and
irrationality (Foucault, 1967) and the power of the medical pro-
fession (Scull, 1975; Foucault, 1967). There is an underpinning
assumption “that there is some underlying pathological process”
(Busﬁeld, 2011, pp.17e18) explaining these emotional expressions,
subsequently contextualised by evidence on social determinants.
The power of the state and psychiatric professionals in classifying
people as mentally disordered is maintained through national
mental health laws that include elements of compulsion, and also
in more subtle forms incorporating community care and notions of
“recovery” (Anthony, 1993; Harper and Speed, 2012).
The medically-dominated approach has provided some beneﬁts
for people with mental distress, evidence suggesting that medica-
tion may for some reduce ‘psychotic’ experiences at least in the
short-term (Bentall, 2009, pp.219e221) and reduce repeated ex-
periences in the longer term (Bentall, 2003, p.499); and that
diagnosis can provide subjectively helpful explanations for
confusing emotional experiences (e.g. Stalker et al., 2005). People
with mental distress now spend less time living in physically
segregated institutions (Bentall, 2009, pp.42e44; Busﬁeld, 2011,
p.178). However, the transformative promise of recovery is insti-
tutionally weak in practice (Hopper, 2007; Davidson et al., 2009)
whilst arguably more insidious in terms of social control (Davidson,
2003, p.36).
It is against this medical conceptualisation and the persistent
evidence of people with mental distress experiencing poor social
outcomes, that the sociology of mental distress has been posi-
tioned.Whilst these perspectives cross-cut, producing “sedimented
layers of knowledge” (Rogers and Pilgrim, 2010, p.11), epistemo-
logical ‘waves’ can be distinguished.
Conﬂict theory-based structuralism uncovered the dominant
social norms and professional powers that maintained social
injustice for people with mental distress (e.g. Foucault, 1967; Scull,
1975). Symbolic interactionist and social constructivist studies
demonstrated the impacts of these power-inﬂected social relations
at a micro-level, including stigmatisation and labelling (e.g. Szasz,
1960; Goffman, 1961; Scheff, 1966). Whilst the former approachminimised the agency and diversity of people with mental distress,
the latter underplayed analysis of wider structural inﬂuences on
micro-level interactions. Both types of study inﬂuenced a third
wave of literature foregrounding ‘survivor’ experience of the psy-
chiatric system, with an increasing role for user-led research into
experiences of mental health services (e.g. Tew et al., 2006;
Reynolds et al., 2009). Survivor-inﬂuenced approaches have rein-
forced the centrality of oppression of people with mental distress,
arguing that the psychiatric system both denies meaningful choice
and has not improved social outcomes (e.g. Plumb, 1993; Beresford,
2012). However, survivor-inﬂuenced research is opaque about di-
versity of user experiences beyond those which are oppressive (e.g.
Reynolds et al., 2009) which holds the risk of leaving the analysis of
material experiences of mental distress to medicalised epistemol-
ogies, and, as Tew et al. argue (2006, pp.11e13), is in conﬂict with
taking user accounts seriously. These collective limitations have led
to a fourth critical realist ‘turn’ (e.g. Rogers and Pilgrim, 2003)
which seeks to incorporate all perspectives, including medicalised
epistemologies and inﬂuences on social outcomes beyond the
mental health system itself, whilst maintaining a normative stance
(Watson, 2012, p.102). However, in the context of mental distress,
this has been applied for the purposes of critique of the medical
model (e.g. Rogers and Pilgrim, 2003; Pilgrim and Bentall, 1999)
rather than to conduct primary research.
So, whilst successfully highlighting the power of dominant so-
cial norms and the oppressive role of professional powers within
the psychiatric system (c.f. Bracken et al., 2012), these social per-
spectives leave analytical gaps. They can diminish normativity, for
example in terms of the potential signiﬁcance of the mental health
system in preserving life. The focus on critique of the medical
model means that sociological analyses tend to essentialise the
agent and neglect diversity in distress trajectories (Bolton, 2008,
pp.83e91). The focus on the dominant psychiatric model and sys-
tem can diminish the role of multiple wider inﬂuences on social
outcomes (Rogers and Pilgrim, 2003) whilst fuller analyses operate
only at the level of critique.
Although the principle in survivor-inﬂuenced studies of acting
as a “countervailing force to experts’ control and production of
knowledge” (Rogers and Pilgrim, 2003, p.186) remains powerful, a
gap remains for a theoretically-informed model to conceptualise
the experiences of people with mental distress which can norma-
tively draw these sedimented layers of research together,
respecting concepts of diversity, agency, social relations and
structure. Beresford (2012, p.159) notes that social understandings
still lack a model with the power to explain disadvantage and with
the potential to transform the way in which people with mental
distress are socially perceived. Hopper (2007) suggests that the CA
offers such a model.
3. The capabilities approach and mental distress
The CA has the potential to shed light on the social outcomes of
people with mental distress in a way which is not restricted to use
of services or compliance with treatment regimens because it fo-
cuses on whether all people have the freedom to live a valued life.
Capabilities is analytically signiﬁcant in the context of social un-
derstandings of mental distress as it does not assume oppression or
social injustice, but offers a framework to explain how oppression
may or may not occur in the context of the psychiatric system and
wider social structures whilst maintaining a normative stance. So, it
offers the possibility of bringing together both the biomedical and
the social in the study of mental health, expanding the analysis.
The CA utilises a range of interlinking concepts to understand
how people achieve social outcomes (see, for example, Robeyns,
2005; Nussbaum, 2011; Venkatapuram, 2011). From this range,
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agency, and normativity are strongly established (e.g. Deneulin and
McGregor, 2010) and are the focus of this paper.
In the capabilities lexicon, functionings refer to what a person is
doing; capabilities are the person's practical opportunity to make
alternative, valued choices. Capabilities are “the substantive free-
doms [that a person] enjoys to lead the kind of life he or she has
reason to value” (Sen, 1999, p.87). The CA is concerned not only
with what people do do, but what people could do: the range of
alternatives from which people can substantively choose. To what
extent, for example, are people with mental distress able to secure
meaningful relationships, have children, and pursue satisfying
work?
In the CA good social outcomes are understood not simply in
terms of resources held or subjective contentment (Deneulin and
McGregor, 2010, p.505). Capabilities treats human beings as ends
not means (Deneulin and McGregor, 2010, pp. 504e506) and is
interested in outcomes in terms of the “actual living that people
manage to achieve” (Sen, 1999, p.73).
Agency is fundamental to capabilities, Sen arguing that “the
good life is partly a life of genuine choice, and not one in which the
person is forced into a particular life - however rich it might be in
other respects” (1993, p.39 n.26). A capabilities analysis would
evaluate the degree to which, for example, service providers
“support people in their own choices and pursuits” rather than “act
as prerequisites or substitutes for the lives they desire to lead”
(Davidson et al., 2009, p.41). For Hopper, in the context of mental
distress the signiﬁcance of agency is in the freedom to pursue
“demanding, potentially destabilizing endeavours” so allowing the
“dignity of risk” (2007, p.877).
Finally, the CA takes a normative stance. Nussbaum, for example,
argues that her version of the CA, incorporating a series of
threshold capabilities domains which all societies should be up-
holding for all citizens (2003, p.40), constitutes a “minimal account
of social justice” (2006, p.71; see also 2011, ch.2). Venkatapuram's
analysis of justice in health takes a distinctive starting assumption
from disease or other health models, his capabilities deﬁnition of
health being “her abilities to be and do things that make up a
minimally good, ﬂourishing and non-humiliating life for a human
being in the contemporary world” (2011, p.20). This normative,
ethical deﬁnition requires good health to be evaluated to a mini-
mum social standard, regardless of disease status. This has partic-
ular signiﬁcance in the context of mental distress, given the
contested history of psychiatric diagnosis.
Together these demonstrate the ethical foundation of the CA:
normatively exploring substantive freedoms and how these shape
social outcomes; and quizzing whether institutional arrangements
aid or hinder human ﬂourishing (Holmwood, 2013, p.6). Evaluating
social outcomes in terms of “what people are actually able to do and
be” suggests a fuller analysis than exploring relations within the
mental health system; Davidson et al. (2009) contend that the in-
terest in human freedoms, diversity and self-determination
inherent in capabilities can take analysis beyond institutional
provision into the issues of social justice at the heart of interest for
analysis of health and wellbeing. These suggest the potential for
capabilities as a conceptual framework to build on existing socio-
logical ‘waves’.
Hopper (2007), Davidson et al. (2009) andWallcraft and Hopper
(2015) have argued that applying the CA to understand mental
distress from a social perspective using qualitative methods is
overdue and may hold conceptual, analytical and theoretical ad-
vantages. Although several UK studies have aimed to apply capa-
bilities as a method for evaluating mental health services (e.g.
Lorgelly et al., 2008; Simon et al., 2013), only Tang (2016) has
used in-depth qualitative methods to apply the CA to psychiatricservice users in the UK, with a focus on recovery in the Chinese
community.
The next section explains the methodological approach.
4. Study design
The paper is based on data collected as part of an ESRC funded
study exploring whether and how the CA can be applied to provide
a normative means of explaining the social justice experiences of
people with mental distress (Brunner, 2015). Individual interviews
were conducted (December 2012 to October 2013) with twenty-
two adults living in Glasgow with recent in-patient experience of
psychiatric hospital, sixteen participants being interviewed twice.
Ethical approval for the study was granted by the College of Social
Sciences Ethics Committee, University of Glasgow.
Participants were purposively recruited as: having experience of
being a statutory or voluntary inpatient in a psychiatric unit since
the January 2006 implementation of the Mental Health (Care and
Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003; not currently being subject to
inpatient treatment; and currently using or not using psychiatric
services. This limited the sample to those recently in hospital,
reducing retrospective bias. The criteria of hospitalisation acted as a
cipher for a likely signiﬁcance of mental distress experience in each
participant's life. In order to draw on a range of experiences,
recruitment was through third sector mental health networks,
advocacy groups, at a university, and through wider social
networks.
Interviews were framed by combining concepts from the CA
with sociological literature, seeking to: understand the relationship
between personal, social and structural factors affecting lived ex-
periences; consider the character of social justice experienced; and
conceptualise this using concepts from the CA. They offered par-
ticipants an opportunity to talk about their life as a whole, rather
than focusing on service provision, averting a common constraint of
research with this population (Rogers and Pilgrim, 2010,
pp.242e251). As little was known about how the CAwould relate to
experiences, an innovative approach was used, adapting the
research design of Wolff and De-Shailt (2007). The questions in the
ﬁrst interviewwere framedwith implicit regard to the CA, enabling
capabilities concepts to be induced. The second interviews were
explicitly structured using the CA by devising an original diagram of
threshold capabilities domains, adapted from the work of
Nussbaum (2000, 2006) and Burchardt and Vizard (2011), to guide
the conversation. Participants were encouraged to discuss the ‘in-
gredients’, or domains, in the diagram (Fig. 1) in relation to their
own experience. An ‘anything else’ domain enabled participants to
highlight additional domains of unanticipated signiﬁcance.
Both sets of interviews were audio recorded with consent,
transcribed, and thematised using Nvivo10 software. Following
Braun and Clarke's conceptualisation of thematic analysis using a
constructivist epistemology (2006, p.85) and an interpretative
approach to analysis (2006, p.84) the study sought to draw out
“underlying ideas, assumptions and conceptualizations e and ide-
ologies” (2006, p.84, their emphasis). Therefore, a weak social
constructivist position was used (Rogers and Pilgrim, 2010, pp.
15e16) seeking to access discourses, perceptions and meanings,
whilst striving for objectivity within this. This approach was
compatible with social perspectives on mental distress, which also
advocate the engagement of personal experience with structural
barriers (e.g. Beresford, 2004, p.218).
In Nvivo10, nodes and levels of sub-node were prioritised by
evaluating: saliency of theme across the sample; in-case or small
group signiﬁcance, indicating an exceptional narrative on the
research questions; and with reference to theoretical and empirical
literature in the sociology of mental distress and in capabilities. This
Fig. 1. Threshold capabilities domains diagram.
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gained, resulting in conclusive themes, including the four discussed
below.
Therewere limitations to this approach. Datawas subjective and
no attempt was made to conﬁrm peoples' accounts, although the
second interviews provided an opportunity to check in-
terpretations; there was no reliable means of comparing the depth
or character of peoples' subjective experiences of mental distress,
so the inﬂuence of this on outcomes was not explored; and the
active choice of participants to join the study, and their connect-
edness with networks used for recruitment, potentially distin-
guishes them from others. The small sample reﬂects the persistent
tension in social research between depth of understanding and
breadth of generalisation (e.g. Silverman, 2005); Glasgow is not
assumed to be representative of any other geographical area; and
ethnic minority groups were missing from the sample, despite at-
tempts to recruit, further limiting generalisability. Whilst the re-
searcher's role as framer, interviewer and interpreter of the data
shaped the study, research ﬁndings were sent to participants and
gatekeepers in order to seek face validity. A future study could
replicate the methods used.
Eleven men and elevenwomen participated in the ﬁrst round of
interviews, of whom eight of each participated in the second round.
The age range was twenty-four to ﬁfty-eight years, with age of ﬁrst
psychiatric hospitalisation ranging from ﬁfteen to ﬁfty-one. Sixteen
participants received welfare beneﬁts, several of these also un-
dertaking minor employment or volunteering; four were students;
two were in full-time work. Participants collectively recalled forty-
nine periods in psychiatric units through their lives. Sixteen par-
ticipants described self-harm or suicide attempts. Speciﬁcation of
these features was subject to recall, subjective deﬁnitions, and thedistinctive character of each interview.
In the interviews people talked about experiencing mental
distress in voices and visions, about feeling low, about suicide at-
tempts, and about feeling high - highs sometimes being insightful,
but never entirely non-problematic. They talked about the mental
health system and its sometimes positive short-term role in pre-
serving life, but also about some very distressing inpatient expe-
riences. They described the complications of medications and
diagnoses, reinforcing the known reliability and validity problems
of these (Bentall, 2003). Participants described how they used their
agency, about how opportunities to achieve socially valued out-
comes like education and employment were shaped, and about
how structural features, especially the welfare beneﬁts system,
constrained agency and so their functionings, capabilities and
outcomes.
5. Findings
Four interlinking themes emerged from the analysis which
demonstrate the contribution that taking a capabilities approach
offers: focusing on actual lived outcomes; considering what people
could do (capabilities) as well as what people are doing (func-
tionings); offering a normative framework for conceptualising
these experiences; and maintaining a focus on agency.
5.1. Focusing on actual lived outcomes
The capabilities focus on outcomes, or what people are actually
able to be and do in life, constitutes a move away from evaluation
on the basis of resources held, subjective wellbeing or other ciphers
(Sen, 1980, 2010). This is exempliﬁed here by comparing the
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the valued social outcome of gaining employment.
For the ﬁve years since he was last discharged from hospital,
Martin had support workers from a voluntary organisation visiting
him at home seven mornings a week. They “Have a tidy up, sit and
talk, do social things, see I'm alright, make sure I take my pills and
that sort of thing”. However, Martin's preference was to ﬁnd
employment: “If it's a decent job that pays well I'll be very happy,
very happy”. Whilst Martin had avoided further psychiatric hos-
pital admission, by focusing on outcomes, a capabilities analysis
exposes an ambiguity in the role of the support workers: are they
helping Martin to achieve a valued social outcome, or are they
placing him in a “trap” (Estroff, 1981), deprived of the “dignity of
risk” (Hopper, 2007). Martin remained out of work, but rather than
focus on helping him to achieve this outcome, professionals instead
focused on his domestic care.
Psychiatry, with its focus on managing mental distress, could
also constrain the possibility of gaining employment. At his ﬁrst
interview, Arthur described how his desire to change from sup-
ported employment to mainstream employment was constrained
by medical advice:
I would like a full-time job. The doctor says I can't do it… every
year I think I'm getting better because of medication and every
year she says ‘you cannae go to work the now’… I used to pick
up voices so the doctors don't wantme to go towork and pick all
those voices up … I don't think I'm going to get a full-time job
but that would be a dream come true.
By the second interview, an incident at his supported employ-
ment project in which he needed help with shovelling and was
“knackered” had led to Arthur changing his position:
…the psychiatrist is right… I couldn't… handle the pressure of
a full time job… I'm not going to be able to work… [but] I can
still go and do volunteer things… three times a week, a couple
of hours a day… so that's ﬁne with me at present.
In interview one Arthur wanted to achieve the social outcome of
full-time paid work; in interview two voluntary work was sufﬁ-
cient. But Arthur and his medical team had self-limited his
preferred outcome, having a mutual limited conception of possible
jobs - not all require physical ﬁtness, for example. Whilst, on the
face of it, this position sought to reduce the possibility of reoccur-
rence of Arthur's mental distress, the experience of Martin dem-
onstrates how this can frustrate the possibility of achieving better
social outcomes.
Using a capabilities analysis to focus on actual experienced
outcomes, these stories reveal how professionals can constrain the
potential for people with mental distress to achieve socially valued
outcomes such as employment, so adding to explanation of how
poor macro-level outcomes happen for this group.5.2. Using capabilities and functionings to expand the analysis
Exploring experiences using the concepts of functionings and
capabilities demonstrates how public services can open up or close
down opportunities for people to expand their potential fromwhat
they can do to what they could do.
Prior to his admission, Gary's past employment functionings
were in factory work. He had dramatically tried to kill himself after
a long period with poor mental health and an unsatisfying job, on
unchanging anti-depressants. On leaving hospital, Gary had time to
pursue creative and therapeutic activities as part of hisrehabilitation. These had offered him a glimpse of new capabilities,
with the worst scenario being going back to the same type of
unsatisfying work:
…you get quite a lot of freedom when you're mentally ill
because your sick ticket's out in years… I've got the freedom to
come in here and play a drum and … make a bike and then
suddenly you get that [job] interview and it can be all just
snatched away, you're back in the rut, thirty quid a week and
your vision is a cleaning job down at the shopping centre… that
is not what I want tae be looking at… but they think that's good
… I think that looks bloody as if I'm going to be back in [psy-
chiatric unit] in six months [laughs]…
Gary had a probation ofﬁcer who aimed to get him into work as
a forklift driver similar to the factory jobs he held before his suicide
attempt:
I got my probation ofﬁcer telling me a couple of weeks ago …
that you could go for like a forklift licence… her drive is to get
me back [into work] and I've just found the … bike and the
music course… it's tookme this long tae get back intae wanting
tae live again and wanting tae get out - never mind spending all
day in a dingy, dark warehouse collecting cardboard boxes for
somebody.
The probation ofﬁcer was revisiting Gary's functionings,
attempting to get him into comparable work to his previous
experience. But Gary now saw a new set of capabilities as possible,
revealed by experiencing music therapy and bicycle repair, along-
side his insight that his previous work environment stimulated his
mental distress. His desire to widen his capabilities conﬂicted with
his probation ofﬁcer's desire to return him to the same employ-
ment ﬁeld, maintaining the functionings that had led to poor social
outcomes and simultaneously limiting his capabilities to change
direction.
However, professionals could sometimes provide the basis for
expanding capabilities. Prior to psychiatric hospital, Francine had a
responsible role in the armed services, which she left as she felt
that her expression of mental distress was in conﬂict with the
values of her employer:
…it's just not appropriate for somebody e an ofﬁcer e to be
walking round a base with tears streaming down her face. Or
there were days where I felt I couldn't put my uniform on
because I felt that I was betraying what that uniform stood for.
Francine's psychiatrist helped her to reconsider her employ-
ment functionings:
…my psychiatrist … had this sympathy towards… more spiri-
tual, holistic type ideas, instead of just plugging you full of drugs
and sending you home, hewould do a bit of work. Andwe ended
up one day with… the thought for me that I wanted to explore
ministry again.
Francine was now in training to become a Minister, demon-
strating that mental health professionals can open up new capa-
bilities, leading to the potential for new functionings and valued
social outcomes.
Using capabilities and functionings enables us to see how in-
stitutions and professionals can restrict peoplewithmental distress
from changing direction in life. This is important because estab-
lished evidence on social determinants suggests that placing
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taining the same functionings - tends to result in the same out-
comes. However, the data show that professionals can also support
people with mental distress to widen their capabilities, opening up
potential for being and doing different things, and so the oppor-
tunity for changing their social position.5.3. Applying a normative analytical framework
Whether people are able to do and be activities above a mini-
mum threshold in the domains framework (Fig. 1) offers a
normative capabilities contribution to understanding social out-
comes. Using the domains diagram in the second interviews
highlighted a variety of elements that enabled people to live well in
each of the domains. The domain ‘Relating to animals, plants, and
the world of nature’ (Fig. 1) drew out the high value that pets can
have, even in terms of life and death: “one of the things that keeps
me going is my gerbils because then I think well if I die and no one
ﬁnds me … what's going to happen to the gerbils?”. However,
achievements in this domain could be constrained. Jon talked about
how lack of money could stop him doing hillwalking to support his
mental health:
…when it's not too far it's ok to drive because of the petrol, but
you don't want to be going too far on your own if you can get a
lift or get some people to go in your car, try and cut the cost. So
because of that it’s not always easy…
Lack of money strongly constrained participants achieving good
social outcomes across the domains that capabilities argues that all
should be able to achieve (Nussbaum, 2011), an example of what
Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) term “corrosive disadvantages”. The
impact on the ‘Enjoying individual, family and social life’ domain
was especially salient. Tim highlighted the impact on being with his
young sonwho stayed at weekends if his incomewas reduced at his
forthcoming disability beneﬁt review:
…because I get middle rate [disability beneﬁt] I have my travel
card … if I go to three [mental health organisation] classes,
[drama group], that's going to cost… twelve pound maybe. And
then… getting… to [town] on the train and bus for myself, and
then paying for myself… and [son] to get back. And then [return
journeys]. So you're talking… thirty-ﬁve pound a week… so if I
didn't have this travel card I'd be ‘snookered’. And the only
reason I get this travel card is because of [disability beneﬁt] …
Fiona and Gary were each affected by the UK Spare Room Sub-
sidy, or 'Bedroom Tax', policy. Their spare bedrooms were regularly
used for family members to stay and provide support. However,
Fiona and Gary's incomes would now be reduced if they wanted to
continue this, the policy either reducing their ability to ‘Enjoy in-
dividual, family and social life’ or reducing their already low in-
comes (‘Enjoying a comfortable standard of living, with
independence and security’).
Fiona and Gary, amongst others, lived with persistent threat to
their ‘Being healthy’ domain (Fig. 1) due to inadequate incomes or
disruptions to their welfare beneﬁts having a potential impact on
their mental health. Taking a normative approach shows how sta-
bilising social security at a decent level for people with experience
of psychiatric hospital would make a strong basis for people to
achieve personally meaningful outcomes across other domains.
In the ‘Enjoying individual, family and social life’ domain (Fig. 1)
participants discussed tensions between having children and
experiencing mental distress (Read and Baker, 1996). Harry and hispartner had not had children as his wife experienced mental
distress and took Lithium during the period in which they consid-
ered this:
R: … we don't have any children so and that was a choice
because of mental health with [wife] because she … wouldn't
have been able to cope with that and certainly the medications
that she was on … she'd have had to come off of them to have
children, and that just wasn't open for discussion.
I: Oh right, that's interesting. So the hospital or hospital spe-
cialists were of the view that she would have to come off.
R: Yes.
I: Or you yourselves were convinced of that?
R: We were convinced of that, they said the same because the
medications they said were toxic to children. And… she would
have to come off them, and if you'd known her at the time… she
was catatonic half the time and that wasn't down to medication
that was just down to depression in the true sense of the word
where everything's just shut down.
Their ability to achieve this element of the ‘Enjoying individual,
family and social life’ domain was disadvantaged by a combination
of subjective mental distress; their understanding that medication
did beneﬁt Harry's wife's distress; and their understanding of the
contraindication of lithium with pregnancy affecting the health of
their child, a capabilities analysis showing how freedoms and social
outcomes are shaped.
Arthur feared that the stress of children might stimulate his and
his wife's subjective distress, was apprehensive about potential
removal of children by authorities, andwas afraid that childrenmay
be affected by his own distress:
…well I'm schizophrenic and she's manic depression Richard, I
don't think we should have the responsibility of having a child
…maybewhen I wasn't schizophrenic but the now I don't think
I could cope … or she could cope, I think it would put us into
screaming and shouting and that'd put us into a bad depression.
So…we knowwe couldn't have any kids… [W]e've discussed it
… people [wife] knewwas… schizophrenic and got the children
taken off them because they couldn't watch them… that is what
would happen to us…
Arthur's ability to achieve this element of the ‘Enjoying indi-
vidual, family and social life’ domain (Fig. 1) was constrained by his
fatalistic assessment of negative consequences. This was contra-
indicated by another participant, Bridget, with multiple diagnoses,
psychotic experiences, experiences of self-harm, and hospital-
isations. She had brought up her daughter (“I've seen some of my
notes and I've read through them… every single one… said that I
was always a very warm and loving mother…”) who was now an
adult with her own child. They now brought support and meaning
to Bridget's life. This not only demonstrates that people with
mental distress do not have to follow the scenario feared by Arthur,
but also that people can be denied future supportive familial re-
lationships if the dominant normative experience of having chil-
dren is positioned beyond their capabilities.
Dominant norms, for example that people with mental distress
cannot copewith children, are made a living reality by, for example,
weak social supports for parents withmental distress (Stalker et al.,
2011); a continuing medicine-ﬁrst approach to managing mental
distress; few options for alternative management programmes to
medication; lack of informed advice about howother families (such
as Bridget) have parented with mental distress; and lack of infor-
mation about adoption or fostering choices. These reﬂect, adapting
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distress.
5.4. Incorporating agency
The data demonstrate participants using agency, another core
capabilities principle, both within and outside the mental health
system, and show how this was shaped by professionals and
systems.
In the community, people used their agency in order to manage
their feelings of mental distress, demonstrating that they are not
passive recipients of professional support. Walking, exercise,
cooking, and changing lifestyles were used by people to help them
through difﬁcult times. Jon demonstrated the diligence and focus
required: “You need to put in a lot of hard work yourself… [Since] I
gave up caffeine, coffee… I've had less problems mentally…” and
Sophie described her active rebalancing of her lifestyle: “…[I've] cut
back on social things … it was like ‘no wonder I was unwell’
because I was working, I was volunteering at three different places,
I was in a band… I was just trying to ﬁll up my life.”
Since her psychotic 'high' Becky had given up drinking alcohol
and her occasional use of recreational drugs, as she was now
“scared of being put in a psychiatric unit. And losing all control …
I'm probably also scared of, like, suicide … And I'm scared of psy-
chosis”. Her experience highlights the situatedness of agency, her
speciﬁc choices made to manage a threat to life itself but also by
fear of the psychiatric system.
Harry's mental distress made it hard for him to leave the house,
so his pre-mental distress pleasures of watching rugby, mountain
climbing and holidays “don't happen”. However, he argued that he
could still live well as he had created enough “distractions” and
“variety” within the home: computer-based activities, watching
DVDs, and gardening. Although he was using his agency in his own
way, dominant normative expectations about how life should be
lived impinged as mental health professionals sought to inﬂuence
Harry's agency: “I usually see somebody once a week who comes
and spends an hour or so with me and will try and force me to go
out [laughs]”. Harry accepted that his mental distress largely
conﬁned him to home, but he viewed himself as having a rich
lifestyle, engaging with the world through the internet e albeit a
very different one from his pre-distress lifestyle. However, pro-
fessionals sought to re-shape Harry's agency towards a standard
lifestyle, rather than working to improve the social outcomes to be
achieved through Harry's rich and varied indoors lifestyle.
In the community, Jon felt that mental health professionals were
forcing him into a path of taking medication with no alternative
treatment model considered:
I've not got a problem with the Crisis Team, their qualiﬁcations
or how they go about their job. The only problem I've got is that
you'll not get treated if you're trying to bring any other beliefs, or
how you want to see your treatment go… So I took up my own
plan. I've stopped taking two medications.
As well as reinforcing Harry's experience of the domination of
agency by medical professionals, this underpins Plumb's (2012,
p.22) argument that the medical-ethical principle of informed
choice only exists if people have alternative choices that they are
able to pursue. Jon pursuing his own covert plan shows that agency
remains, despite the perceived control taken by professionals.
This analysis underscores the theoretical concerns of Plumb
(1994) and Beresford (2004) over both respect for atypical life-
styles and behaviours, and the role of mental health professionals
in promulgating dominant normative lifestyles. It shows that
people with mental distress use agency and that this is a necessaryfeature to include in explaining social outcomes. Further, a capa-
bilities analysis highlights that the mental health system seeks to
restrict agency as its model for seeking to establish the potential for
longer-term improvement in social outcomes. The problem is that
the macro-level data show that these improvements in social
outcome tend not to result.
6. Discussion and conclusion
Exploring peoples' experiences using capabilities demonstrates
that poor social outcomes are shaped by more than mental distress
experiences alone or the mental health system alone, so com-
plementing biomedical and ‘survivor’ narratives. The data also
show how systems and professionals tend to shape social outcomes
for people with mental distress through regulation and contain-
ment. However, the application of capabilities draws out the
complexity surrounding this, the agentic, social and structural
working in tension, and the power of the mental health system not
removing peoples' agency. Thus capabilities also bridges structur-
alist and symbolic interactionist framings.
The CA offers a novel and practical approach to understanding
how poor social outcomes happen for people with mental distress.
The foregrounding not only of functionings e what people do do e
but also capabilities e what people could do e offers a practical
framework for exploring how to change those dismal outcomes.
The analysis demonstrates how the practices of professionals and
systems tend to narrow possibilities for people to change their
social circumstances, rather than seeking to widen peoples' capa-
bilities and work with their agency. Instead, the analysis suggests
that to improve social outcomes, the role of professionals and
systems should be to support peoples' personal interests and po-
tentials, and also to secure peoples’ threshold domains.
However, the study also highlights the complexity behind this,
adding to the “recovery” agenda: agency is inherent, but irregular;
and capabilities are personal. So, account needs to be taken of in-
dividual volitions and interests. But by also focusing on the
normative: how to support people to secure threshold capabilities
or minimum social standards e such as having children or gaining
meaningful work - whilst being attentive to the potential impact of
corrosive disadvantages acting against the achievement of partic-
ular domains, such as very low or insecure incomes, the opportu-
nity for a capabilities-founded recovery agenda emerges. The
evidence suggests that this agenda actually necessitates a threefold
shift in the role of professionals: working with agency and sup-
porting heterogeneity; supporting people to attain valued social
outcomes above minimum standards; and securing threshold ca-
pabilities. This also implies that professionals and systems work
increasingly with the challenge posed above by Rogers and Pilgrim
(2003) in relation to the question of who is the ‘expert’ and whose
knowledge counts.
The CA adds methodological, theoretical and normative value to
understanding how poor social outcomes tend to be reproduced for
people with mental distress. It can be operationalised in a way that
complements core sociological concerns of relations between
agency and structure, and holds potential for bridging biomedical
and social approaches. The study design can be replicated to
explore the reproduction of poor social outcomes in wider health
and wellbeing contexts. The promise of capabilities offered by
Hopper in this journal (2007) is justiﬁed; its concepts offer a fuller
and original explanation, and with the potential to transform
(Beresford, 2012, p.159).
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